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Abstract—By its definition, the word ‘currency’ refers to an agreed medium for exchange, a nation’s 
currency is the formal medium enforced by the elected governing entity. Throughout history, issuers 
have faced one common threat: counterfeiting. Despite technological advancements, overcoming 
counterfeit production remains a distant future. Scientific determination of authenticity requires a 
deep understanding of the raw materials and manufacturing processes involved. This survey serves as 
a synthesis of the current literature to understand the technology and the mechanics involved in 
currency manufacture and security, whilst identifying gaps in the current literature. Ultimately, a 
robust currency is desired. 
Keywords—currency forensics, currency security, banknote recognition, substrate analysis, ink 
analysis, counterfeit currency 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout recorded history, as our society has evolved, we have relied on the ability to exchange 
goods and services with one another. The earliest known medium of exchange was the barter system, 
although this system still exists, ‘bartering’ has largely been superseded by formal mediums such as 
coins, banknotes, and more recently, electronic currency.  
    Traditionally, formal mediums of exchange, or ‘currency’ represents an agreed medium both 
enforced and controlled by the state, today consisting of uniform items holding value. The value held 
in currency exists purely by the faith entrusted in authenticity, a common challenge currency issuers 
have faced is securing the design against counterfeits.  
    In many nations, government owned central banks officially known as “reserve banks” manage the 
nation’s entire monetary policy. Amongst numerous other tasks, they are entrusted as the sole 
banknote and coin issuing authorities, assuming full responsibility for security and design, ultimately 
controlling the level in circulation at any point in time. 
    Today currency consists of a combination of coins, banknotes and electronic data, still 
counterfeiting remains a threat, made possible by continuous technological advances in reprographic 
equipment available to the general public. The stability of society arguably rests to some degrees, on 
the confidence we place on our currency, and this confidence level is directly related to security. 
    The challenges facing currency forensics are many, the effort required to detect counterfeit 
banknotes is directly correlated to the skill level of those producing the counterfeits, which shows no 
sign of stopping. Clearly, detection is not a trivial task, to forensically determine authenticity, one 
must possess a deep understanding of all features. 
    Reserve or central banks are relatively new, traditionally privately owned banks issued their own 
form of currency. After centuries of unpredictability and incompatibility between currencies and 
widespread counterfeit operations, central banks were formed to centralize currency issue and policy 
management. Such entities are given appropriate legal authority, this differs depending on the country 
in question. 
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    A counterfeiters’ primary objective is to produce passable reproductions, by mastering known 
security features. Security features are classified into one of three categories: 1) immediately 
detectable through human senses, 2) hidden from normal view of our senses, detectable using basic 
tools, such as a magnifying glass or Ultra Violet (UV) light, 3) intrinsic characteristics resulting from 
the manufacturing process and the interaction of raw materials. 
    Physical currency is subject to wear and tear, further complicating inspection this degradation is not 
uniform. For instance, ink may wear more rapidly on some areas on paper currency than on others, 
and notes in warmer climates are known to wear more rapidly than those in cooler climates. 
Counterfeiters have been seen to take advantage of this by purposely dirtying specific areas of 
banknotes, making distribution inconspicuous and detection more troublesome. 
    To minimize and control the circulation of counterfeit banknotes, Automatic Teller Machines 
(ATM) and central banknote sorting machines incorporate banknote recognition software. A 
combination of image processing, machine learning, and pattern recognition, this software is trained 
to check specific security features using learned threshold values. Threshold values serve as templates 
of known good values, a banknote which does not meet the specified threshold value is deemed to 
either be counterfeit or worn out, then removed from circulation.  
    Typically, banknote recognition software is programmed to check print quality, in the observed 
literature (http://www.rhondasoftware.com/software-solutions/computer-vision/100-usd-banknotes-recognition), quality 
is defined as fidelity of the captured image to an original or known good value. Although this 
approach considers the highly important print quality, it is interesting that the majority of features 
remain to be authenticated through manual inspection only. Counterfeiters are likely to near perform 
the art of certain security features, but are unlikely to perform all features. Reproduction of security 
features, difficult to replicate Intaglio print press and Offset Lithographic printing methods, and 
composed of closely guarded secret ink and substrate recipes. 
    A growing trend is towards the research and development of technologies such as embedding Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) devices adding further security into existing banknotes, and the 
paradigm shift towards an electronic currency. Similar to traditional mediums, electronic currency 
comes in many variations from that which is issued and backed by the state or issuing authority, 
mobile payment systems, and complete virtual currency existing within cyberspace communities. 
   The exact meaning of electronic money is somewhat abstract and subjective, electronic money 
consists of any electronic value which is exchangeable just like physical currency, such as banknotes 
and coins, but it is not consistent or uniform. This inconsistent are at times incompatible array of 
stored value and electronic payment systems are complicated to regulate. 
    The electronic currency paradigm currently lacks governance, and is apparent from the wide array 
of largely incompatible models in use today such as the e-Coin. Electronic currency, may be 
considered an electronic counterpart to the coin or banknote, as users are assured anonymity, 
currencies are issued using one-way hashing. This is in contrast to debit and credit cards, where 
transactions are reversible. This is currently an active area of research with real world 
implementations in use today. The strength of irreversible transactions fundamentally relies on the 
strength of the hashing method used, clearly the electronic paradigm presents a totally new set of 
governance and security concerns. 
    Counterfeit detection has traditionally been a task for law enforcement agencies [1,2,3], experts are 
trained through years of hands on experience similar to that of Questioned Document Examiners 
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(QDEs) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Questioned_document_examination). Scientific societies encourage 
research toward understanding the nature of documents. QDE is a specialized niché area within 
forensic science defining methods for analysis of such intrinsic document characteristics as 
handwriting, signature, printing, paper, and ink analysis. 
A. Ideal Security Features 
The following list summarizes the optimal security features currently securing banknotes against 
forgery, optimal in this case indicates that aspects are robust to fatigue and forgery. 
1) Substrate 
a) Complex substrate recipe 
b) Windowed security thread 
c) Security fibres 
d) Watermark 
e) See through windows 
2) Ink 
a) Complex ink recipe 
b) Colour-shifting ink                                
c) Ultra violet ink 
3) Printing 
a) Serial number 
b) Design complexity 
c) Intaglio printing 
d) Offset Lithographic Printing 
 
B. Attacks and Vulnerabilities of Currency 
There are three principal attacks on currency, namely: duplication, imitation, mutilation. The 
following describes the attacks in detail and how they relate to the security features listed in Section I-
A. 
1) Duplication 
a) Photographing. By taking high resolution, high quality photographs of banknotes high quality 
replica banknotes can be reproduced through traditional darkroom photographic enlargement 
techniques. These are difficult to detect at first glance as colours are true to life, however the 
substrate has considerably different tactile qualities. 
b)  Photocopying. Photocopy is one of the major nuisances causing a fluctuation of counterfeit 
currency world-wide during the 1908s and 1990s. Photocopying is one of the more naïve 
approaches tempting only the casual counterfeiter, typically using standard office quality 
paper and inks are easily detected due to repeating serial numbers and uncharacteristic feel 
and colours tend to be dull compared to the genuine article. 
c)  Scanning. It is more troublesome than photocopying as counterfeiters can process images 
using Photoshop editing software (http://www.adobe.com/products/photoshop.html?promoid=JOLIW). 
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This allows for precision modification specifically of serial numbers making duplicates 
potentially difficult to detect depending on the print, ink and substrate fidelity. 
2) Imitation 
a)  Desktop publishing. Tempting the casual or low funded counterfeiter, today’s equipment is 
capable of producing high quality documents representing documents passable at the first 
glance. Although equipment is capable of producing high quality documents, the current 
ability cannot match the Intaglio and Offset Lithographic methods, ink tends not to be bold 
and fades much quicker. Under microscopic inspection, microtext and Guilloché patterns are 
not rendered with the required quality. 
b)  Commercial publishing. A higher precision is achieved on the intricate microtext and 
Guilloché patterns. Likewise the vibrancy and true to life fidelity of colours resulting from 
higher quality commercial grade, inks tend to allow for superior print and image fidelity over 
that of desktop publishing. Similarly, the substrate used is usually of higher quality even 
remarkably similar in, thickness, Grams per Square Meter (GSM) and fibre texture. Here the 
embedded security components such as watermarks, security fibres, and security threads are 
often overlooked as there is not such control over the substrate. 
c)  Intaglio offset lithographic production. Usually reserved for legitimate banknote 
manufacturers, or highly funded criminal organizations. By using identical methods to those 
that are required for creating legitimate banknotes, makes identification extremely 
troublesome. At this level, great care is usually taken to use both substrates and inks similar in 
composition to the genuine article. This is where uncharacteristic anomalies of the printing 
process observed on known legitimate print press machines should be used to determine 
authenticity. In addition, the embedded security components such as security fibres, threads 
and watermarks deviate when compared to the original. 
3) Mutilation 
a)  Ink removal. There are various techniques of removing ink from using light amounts of acid 
and bleach, through to concentrated laser removal techniques. The purpose of removing ink is 
to covertly modify a note of a lower value to present as a higher value note whilst keeping the 
underlying authentic substrate. 
b)  Precision cutting and joining with clear adhesive. Banknotes can be cut into precise vertical 
strips to produce subsequent banknotes after several strips. Initially difficult to detect, under 
close inspections, image edges tend to be slightly disjointed deviating from the original image 
depending on the precision and amount of banknotes used. 
II. CURRENCY SECURITY AND FORENSICS 
To successfully distribute counterfeit currency, the end product must be inconspicuous achieved by 
thwarting security components. The level of success is determined by how close the product compares 
to the genuine article. 
    Forensic analysis therefore, must observe and measure predetermined intrinsic characteristics of 
known security components, specifically analyzing whether each security component deviates from 
known good values. Table I defines the three levels of security components that may be found in 
banknotes. Typically a threshold value defining known good values of image and colour fidelity is 
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used in security applications such as ATMs and banknote sorting machines to determine authenticity 
and fatigue. 
    The first level security is directed towards the human senses, typically sight and touch, but also 
sound, it is noteworthy that the majority of security components are found in this level. The second 
level security is approximately hidden from view of our senses without using basic equipment, such 
as a UV lamp or magnifying glass. The third level characteristics are reserved for QDEs or forensic 
examiners, such measures often are inherent characteristics resulting from the raw materials and 
printing processes used. The level at which a security component falls within determines the first 
point and thus complexity involved in determination, the level of confidence required may require 
further investigation depending on the quality of the note in question. 
Table I. Level 1, 2, and 3 security feature classification in banknote design 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Substrate Fidelity  
Print Fidelity  
Colour Fidelity  
Acoustic Fidelity  
Serial Number  
Holograms  
Watermark  
Security Thread  
Security Fiber 
Planchets 
Tactile Fidelity 
Color-shifting Ink 
Clear Window 
Matching Sides 
Latent Image 
Microtext  
UV Glowing Ink 
 
Magnetic Ink 
Screen Traps 
Manufacture Anomalies 
Materials Interaction 
Complicated Patterns 
Complicated Design 
Fluorescence Eminence 
Texture Analysis 
 
 
 
A. Features 
Printing, the application of colour, consists of three main components: pigment, solvent, and drier. 
Looking at the individual components, pigment controls the colour; solvent combines the pigment 
with the drying agent, which then binds pigment to the substrate. The two primary banknote printing 
methods, Intaglio press and Offset Lithography differ by the solvents’ chemical composition used [4]. 
Intaglio press printing ink dries by evaporation, drying takes considerably longer than Offset 
Lithography. As the time is longer, the ink has more time to spread creating which is known as the 
feathering effect, where the edges appear to run. Offset Lithographic ink is oil based, drying is 
achieved by heating the substrate, chemical polymerization occurs giving a sharper line on edges, and 
a brighter overall result than Intaglio press printing. Forensic examination is achieved by 
discriminating print methods, scanning at a high resolution and zooming into the edges or by 
microscope to look for typical characteristics, clearly this method is subject to human error. 
    The ink ingredients typically differ from one currency to the next, ink needs to be both durable and 
difficult to copy. This requires top secret unique blends of raw materials, subsequently, each 
combination emits different levels of radiation. The US Secret Service over the last century has been 
building an ink library for forensic purposes [5], this library supports analysis by providing a 
reference point allowing for both discrimination of ink compositions, and estimation of age. 
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Spectrography requires a device used to separate incoming light waves reflected from matter into 
a frequency spectrum, light waves reflected from the ink can be characterized and analyzed. This 
opens up a whole new domain for the forensic analysis of banknotes, testing characteristics outside of 
what we can see through the Human Visual System (HVS). 
Uniqueness can be programmed for security purposes, where currencies emit unique levels in the 
infrared and UV spectrum [6, 7], this has been investigated in a forensic setting using a spectrography 
microscope [8] for investigation of layer three security features. 
Mössbauer spectroscopy is a nondestructive alternative method to determining the atomic 
composition of pigments [9]. It is found, the black ink on US banknotes is more stable than green, 
black has very stable structure that is high in iron whilst green is more erratic. Similarly a two photon 
microscope is used, an excitement method used to view photons emitted [10]. Their findings show 
that fluorescence aspects of genuine banknotes differ quite considerably in wavelength and amount of 
photons emitted than fake paper. Analysis is considered for inkjet inks by using Raman spectroscopy 
and laser desorption mass spectrometry techniques [11].  Colour inkjet ink discrimination is found to 
be more reliable than for inkjet documents printed by black only, this is due to manufacturers using 
different raw materials for colour inks but common black carbon in their black inks. 
Raman spectroscopy failed to determine the difference between fake and genuine Euros inks as 
shown in [108] because similar colour spectra obtained for the fake and genuine euro banknote but 
one thing of Raman Spectra still utilised for fake banknote i.e. different areas of fake Euro banknotes 
for the same colour show similar spectra. 
A promising non-destructive novel approach to automated determination of ink age is provided 
by using a Region Of Interest (ROI) [12]. The ROI is sampled across similar documents to determine 
loss in hue of both the RGB and HSV colour spaces, results are promising. Although not strictly 
focussed on banknote research, their method is applicable as banknotes use the same design within a 
series of currency. Fluorescent ink, invisible under normal conditions, viewable only under UV light, 
serves the second layer of security features. Tests confirm fluorescence only covers specific areas of 
the banknotes, other features such as microprinting and watermarks are difficult for machines to 
detect [13,14,15]. 
Fluorescent ink is not difficult for counterfeiters with sufficient motivation and finance, as seen 
in operation Bernhard WWII, over time and numerous experiments it has been shown that UV 
characteristics can be tweaked to create notes with similar levels. 
An effect known as ‘colour-shifting’ made possible by using ‘colour-shifting ink’, ink literally 
changes colour as the viewing angle shifts. Used in Optical Variable Devices (OVDs) 
(http://www.csiropedia.csiro.au/display/CSIROpedia/Optically+Variable+Devices) such as holograms and 
Kinegrams [1], many currency issuers employ this technique. The Euro currency displays a colour-
shift on the denomination numerals, bottom right hand side of the reverse. Recently Securency 
Australia has developed a new technology that uses this idea to mimic nature called Aurora 
(http://www.legalforce.com/aurora-79111433.html). Colour-shift ink is difficult to recreate, precise levels of 
shift are required for authentic currency. If a note is noticed to shift through the colour spectrum at an 
incorrect rate, it will be suspected as counterfeit. 
Known to be used on US banknotes from the early 1960s, magnetic inks, originally intended for 
machine readable cheques consisting of dark pigmentation, limiting usage to colours like dark green, 
stone red, sienna brown and purple violet restricting design. The specific amount of magnetism 
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required is unique within a currency and denomination, methods for automated banknote detection 
and validation by detecting the level of emitted electromagnetism have been developed [15,16]. One 
fundamental drawback is that the level of magnetism is reduced by wear and tear, notes of the highly 
exchanged denominations, typically those of lower values will have a higher false error rate than 
those at the higher value end. 
Thermochromic inks are temperature sensitive, designed to momentarily change colour when the 
substrate reaches a specific temperature range [6]. There is no research showing application of 
thermochromic inks on paper currency, primarily use has been limited to bank cheques and identity 
cards.  
As the sophistication of security inks increase, the methods used to authenticate them must 
follow. Converting to grayscale allows for edge detection supporting discrimination of image fidelity. 
However as the array of colours used in printing paper currency increases, especially on polymer, 
removing colour from the analysis process potentially misses a wealth of information. 
Images are converted to grayscale [17, 18, 19], new values are generated for each pixel, 
compressing the amount of data to be analyzed reducing complexity. New pixel values are generated 
from grayscale values using a linear transform function. 
Conversion of the RGB channels to one single intensity channel, known as intensity thresholding 
above noise level [20], the remaining binary image is referred to as the mask. The RGB channel to 
grayscale is converted [21, 22]. These methods suffer from the fundamental problem that colours with 
similar luminance, differing in hue, such as white and yellow cannot be differentiated when 
converting to grayscale. This results in a loss of potentially meaningful data especially for currencies 
with colours are similar. 
Obtaining grayscale histogram using the previous methods also omits necessary information 
regarding the dirty factor of banknotes [23, 24]. The HSV colour space is a truer measure of colour in 
printed documents than RGB when converting to grayscale, as it separates the intensity (luminance), 
and colour information chromacity [25,26]. The YIQ colour space is used, the Y or ‘luminance’ 
channel is used for analysis of colour characteristics through histogram comparison [27]. 
Pixel averaging does have its caveats [28], whilst removing noise, we may also lose some of the 
intrinsic print defects [29, 30, 31]. Print defects in currency are important during investigation when 
discriminating between individual printer. Each individual printer systematically prints with slight 
defects contributing to the definition of unique print signatures, even applicable to commercial grade 
print machinery such as Offset Lithographic and Intaglio press printers. Print signatures can 
potentially be used to uniquely identify individual printer, therefore pixel averaging must be 
implemented sparingly. 
Printer and substrate ballistics, the study of how substrate surface, materials, and printing 
methods interacts [32]. Each print method has unique characteristics, analysis is used to discriminate 
between printing processes such as inkjet and laser. Intaglio print press and Offset Lithographic 
machines within the same class produce intrinsic anomalies linking individual machines to counterfeit 
notes. 
Very few computer users have accessed to specialized printing equipment, such as Offset 
Lithography and Intaglio print press machines. Although inkjet printers have resolution capabilities 
that rival laser, inkjet are more sensitive to substrate quality, resulting in wider variation when 
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comparing the same characters at the microscopic level. Two types of ink exist for inkjet, those that 
are composed from pigments, and those from dye. Pigment inks tend to be more robust than dye. 
Under a microscope both should in theory show round pixels, in practice the shape tends to be 
uniform [4]. Between inkjet printers there are distinct variations in the nature of the same element 
printed, this is particularly noticeable in the random scatter of satellite droplets and hazy edges. 
Satellite scatter and edge roughness are calculated for printer signatures and profiles when narrowing 
the printer make and model producing questioned currency. 
A geometric displacement is observed between Intaglio print press and Offset Lithographic print 
elements of authenticated € 10 notes [33]. Using a measure called, Maximally Stable Extremal Region 
(MSER), at point (x, y), measuring the displacement is possible by using specific pixels at Points of 
Interest (POI) as reference points. This raises the question whether the method can be used to 
forensically verify banknotes, clearly discriminating by the displacement alone is insufficient as there 
is a noticeable variation amongst authenticated genuine notes.  
    A print signature is extracted from the outer boundary of a text glyph, referred to as Model Based 
Signature Profile (MBSP) [34]. Individual documents are given a signature value calculated from the 
statistical anomalies produced in the printing process by equation (1): 
∑
∑
=
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                                                           (1) 
where 
ije is the strength of an edge corresponding to the digital derivative of the profile image for 
column j  and jw is a windowing function. Test results provide sufficient discrimination with 
probability values for false validation less than 2.3×10-8 and 10-9 for the letter ‘a’ and ‘s’ respectively. 
Clearly this is an extremely low probability, protection against false validation is imperative. The 
lager the false validation probability rate is, the higher the potential rate of counterfeits will slip 
through undetected. 
MBSP and Shape Warp Coding (SWC) are combined for analysis of the interaction between 
substrate and printing process [35]. Inkjet, laser printed documents produce random flecks of stray 
toner on the substrate surface. Signatures can be calculated from the systematic characteristics of such 
anomalies, allowing investigators to potentially pinpoint a laser printer by make and model. 
Printer signatures are calculated using the geometric distortion characteristics of printed 
documents [36, 37, 38]. Geometric distortion introduced by Electrophotography (EP) printers is 
mainly due to variations in the Organic Photoconductive (OPC) drum and polygon mirror, resulting in 
displacement between original and printed output. The dot centre of a satellite droplet of ink or fleck 
of toner is calculated, rotation compensation, geometric signature extraction, then correlation-measure 
of the halftone dots of the input to the printer [36]. A 2D distortion displacement vector is then 
calculated for each halftone dot. 
Differing edges, satellite ink droplets, measuring the homogeneity and uniformity of ink or toner 
on printed substrate can be used as identifiers [39]. To measure this, they employ three specific 
measures: 
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1) Perimeter based edge roughness. A measure which calculates the roughness of a character to 
compare the perimeter difference of a banalized and smoothed image. 
2)  Distance map based edge roughness. A measure of the relation of edge pixels through 
distance mapping. 
3)  Gray value distribution on printed area. The differences obtained are in the uniformity of ink 
or toner coverage within printed regions, by using a thresholding technique uniformity can be 
determined. 
Table II. A list of the representative work in the currency security features section 
Characteristics  Methods  The Work 
Colour 1. Ink library 
2. Thermo chromic inks  
3. Programming black inks to be visible in IR 
4. Discrimination of black printing inks based on 
composition 
5. Raman spectroscopy, LDMS and MALDI-MS [11] 
6. RGB to gray scale conversion  
7. RGB channels to one single intensity channel  
8. Gray level Histogram thresholding  
9. Luminance histogram from Y in the YIQ colour space  
10. Saturation weighted hue variance measurement using the 
HSV colour space 
11. Colour segmentation using the HSV colour space 
12. Authentication color feature based approach for 
determining ink age in printed documents 
[5] 
[6] 
[7] 
[8] 
 
[11] 
[17,18,19,21,13] 
[20] 
[23] 
[27] 
[25] 
 
[26] 
[12] 
 
 
Fluorescence fidelity 
 
13. UV pattern segmentation, signature  
14. Mössbauer X-Ray fluorescence measurement  
15. Intrinsic fluorescence lifetime measurement 
[14, 13] 
[9] 
[10] 
Image fidelity 16. Binarization, edge detection  
17. Axis symmetrical MASKS 
18. Statistical characteristics estimation from neighbour 
pixels 
[21] 
[22] 
[24] 
Serial number 19. Binarization (Otsu’s Method), edge detection (Hough 
transform) 
[17] 
Print fidelity 20. Model based approach on text glyph profiles 
21. Interaction of substrate on printer signature [35] 
22. Geometric distortions based on printed halftone dots [36] 
23. Geometric distortions based on line width [37] 
24. Print signature based on fixed parts of document [38] 
25. Print method discrimination, texture and edge based 
features 
26. Print geometric distortions based on a per character basis 
27. Print offset measurements 
28. 3D signature of substrate surface v.s. print quality 
29. Tie points to measure displacement between offset and 
Intaglio 
[34] 
[35] 
[36] 
[37] 
[38] 
[39] 
 
[40] 
[29,31] 
[44] 
[33] 
Security thread 30. Pulsed eddy current [16] 
 
Such evidence is a crucial step to any investigation regarding questioned currency, or any 
questioned document for that matter. Ruling out known methods of print by unique intrinsic satellite 
droplets and edge characteristics provides investigators with sound methods and resulting evidence 
subject to peer review. 
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Correlating contraband documents with exact individual printer by signature matching, is truly a 
step forward for forensics, concerning currency forensics and questioned document analysis. A 
specific printer can be identified and in some cases even the serial number of the specific printer, the 
fundamental question of where it was printed? In legal cases can be answered, further investigation is 
required to understand how the signatures change over time with respect to machinery wear and tear 
as geometric distortion is caused by physical internals of machinery, over time the machinery 
internals are subject to wear and tear potentially further distorting measurements observed. 
    Printer profiles are calculated for specific character set at differing levels of toner [40]. This method 
is dependent on the toner levels, degradation on the end print, and the particular time in question. The 
motivation is to determine whether manipulation of specific text values has occurred. Banknote serial 
numbers are likely to be modified as sequential or repeating serial numbers raise suspicion. This 
method is based on precise toner level measurement at any particular moment, new profiles have to be 
generated for differing toner levels. Such a method would be invaluable to define profiles with 
varying levels of toner. 
    The philosophy is to authenticate a banknote by detecting the characteristic minute bumps and 
grooves resulting from the Intaglio print press process. A novel algorithm is proposed for feature 
extraction based on incomplete shift invariant Wavelet Packet Transform (WPT) specifically for 
Intaglio [42]. 
    One particular area that raises concern is the degradation of tactility, one of the key security 
features is the Intaglio print press tactile effect. It is found that the tactile effect degrades sharply, 
within a few weeks of circulation, special markings on the Hungarian notes to help the visually 
impaired identify notes are significantly reduced [43,44,45]. 
B. Approaches, Methodologies, and Techniques 
1) Security Components   
Paper is a fibrous matter, raw materials are combined in a large vat, mixed thoroughly adding binding 
agents, chemicals, and dyes resulting in a liquid-fibre pulp. The pulp is pressed through a rolling 
motion, flattening into thin precisely measured layers whilst squeezing out any remaining moisture, 
then finally setting in its final form. The substrate used for the manufacture of paper currency is 
known by the security printing industry as ‘security paper’. What sets security paper apart from 
regular paper is the secret, and unique recipe of raw materials, obscure physical dimensions, 
integrated security features such as watermarks, security threads, and security fibres. 
Paper, at the microscopic level shows a fibrous texture of meshed plant fibres of varying lengths 
depending on the raw materials used. A standard paper is made predominantly from wood pulp, a 
security paper is made from plant material such as reeds, flax and cotton plants, the fibres are 
stronger, and visibly longer when viewed under a microscope [3]. 
Viewing a note under UV light, certain amounts of fluorescence become visible in specific areas 
creating a unique signature, this signature should be nearly identical across a currency. Through side 
by side comparison, one can identify forged security paper using this signature. Due to differing 
climates that raw materials grow and composition of soil UV characteristics can be greatly effected 
and thus the observed signatures contribute as evidence for questioned substrate. 
11 
 
Biaxially-oriented Polypropylene (BOPP) developed as a joint effort by the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA), Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) and the 
University of Melbourne is the next generation of security substrate. Polymer currency looks and feels 
similar to paper currency. At its core is a thin clear plastic film covered by subsequent layers for 
added durability. The BOPP security substrate marketed by Securency (RBA and Inovia Films) is 
called guardian, is said to be more robust, and stay clean for longer than paper as it is non-fibrous and 
nonporous. 
To the naked eye, the surface of BOPP appears and feels smooth to the touch. Under microscopic 
examination, the surface consists of a random scatter craters. Advocates for the use of BOPP security 
substrate claim a robustness surpassing the lifetime of traditional paper substrate, and security features 
not yet feasible with paper. In particular, the see through window feature Figure 1 which turns black 
when scanned or photocopied. 
 
Fig.1. See through window on the New Zealand banknotes in the shape of a fern leaf, also on the 
corresponding side a see through window stating the denomination value having a unique raised 
tactile quality. 
There is growing interest in the development of new security components for embedding through 
the manufacture and printing process. Research [46] shows, the scales of Lepidopetra and elytra of 
Coleoptera butterflies possess micro structures resulting in unique polarization effects. The scales 
create a unique complex texture with detail too minute for desktop publishing equipment to render 
and iridescence effect which could be applied to banknotes. However iridescent ink is available 
meaning basic passable counterfeit reproduction targeting layer one may be possible. 
Paper surface texture can be fingerprinted similar to printer signatures, and identified using 
commodity scanners [47]. A surface is given a unique signature based on the natural imperfections 
occurring in the paper texture. The unique 3D qualities are calculated, it is extremely unlikely that two 
surfaces will present with identical 3D characteristics, however documents created from the same raw 
materials through the same manufacture process will show similarities. A one-way hash value can 
then be calculated and either stored in a database registered against the individual banknote serial 
number, or even printed on the document to provide added security. 
Authenticating a document in this way is extremely robust in theory, especially through values 
stored in a database. However, printing on substrate is subject to fatigue and is more appropriately 
suited to security documents which are not handled often such as diplomas, certificates, land titles. 
Banknotes are handled often, crumpled and smudged constantly throughout their lifespan, such a 
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signature would change over time as banknotes wear. Therefore, any initial hash value will be 
irrelevant for application in banknotes even if stored on a database. 
The majority of security paper manufacturers prefer the lower cost of paper over polymer. 
Although BOPP is initially expensive in comparison, it appears to be gaining in popularity, adopting 
countries have reported a decrease in long-term costs due to increased longevity. One of the world’s 
largest security paper manufacturers has adopted polymer offering a polymer paper hybrid alternative. 
Polymer is not immune to counterfeiting, and appears counterfeiter sophistication is on the rise. 
Clearly, as the sophistication of the counterfeiters rises, forensic analysis of the texture of BOPP must 
be analyzed similar to that of security paper, forensics could benefit from an understanding of BOPP 
surface signatures. This would build way for the development of recognition algorithms to 
authenticate the BOPP substrate using features other than image and colour fidelity. 
Paper results from compression of many plant fibres. A common property of substrates is that 
there will always be some levels of transparency. Held up to a light source, the opposing side will 
blend through, manufacturers exploit this to their advantage embedding latent security components 
between layers. This also applies to polymer substrate, latent images or components are hidden from 
normal view. 
    Coloured fibres known as security fibres are woven into the layers scattered randomly throughout, 
whilst holding up a note to a light source individual fibres become visible, under UV light threads 
glow. Counterfeit notes began to turn up with imitation threads or fibres embedded, and even drawn 
on, these imitations are easily discovered by forensic analysis, however they are not obvious to the 
general public. 
    The security strip or thread is similar to the security fibre, generally a single thread is embedded 
between the layers of the note, typically a metallic thread sometimes incorporating micro-text on the 
strip, seen on the Bangladeshi Takka notes [48]. Windowed threads are a novel variation, more 
difficult to forge as threads are woven in and out of the note surface, typically in 10 mm stretches. 
Viewed normally it looks like a series of discontinuous metallic strips, held up to a light source the 
strip is revealed as a continuous thread. Typically counterfeit attempts are obvious. A commonly used 
method is to print or draw discontinuous thin lines in a metallic ink. 
Planchets are minute disks measuring roughly one millimetre in diameter, are embedded throughout 
the banknote. When held up to a light source, the disks become visible similar to the watermark, 
security fibre, and windowed thread. Planchets take a number of forms from colourless disks which 
react to UV light only, or coloured disks which show through in normal light, for added security, 
planchets can incorporate micro-printing and micro-text. 
    Moiré patterns come in many variations, such effects are created by an optical illusion, and are not 
there at all. These are hidden measures that only become apparent upon unauthorized reproduction, 
such measures are also aptly termed screen traps. 
    The effect is caused by the digitization of a genuine note, followed by an attempt to print from the 
digitized file. Benjamin Franklin, a printer by trade, was a pro-supporter of paper currency over 
precious metals, he intentionally misspelled the word ‘Pennsylvania’ to catch forgers who corrected 
the spelling. His next development showed more sophistication, an actual leaf was embedded in the 
printing process, resulting in unique intricate veins of the leaf, extremely difficult to replicate by 
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etching copper plates by hand which was the only method available at the time [2], this complexity of 
design has remained paper currencies’ greatest security defence through to the present day. 
    Security patterns are intricate geometrical repeating designs at such a fine detail that traditionally 
made counterfeiting banknotes by hand extremely difficult, interestingly it still remains at the 
forefront of security exploiting the fact that current desktop publishing technologies available to the 
public are not capable of rendering images to the required intricate level of detail achieved by Intaglio 
and Offset Lithography [49] (http://www.indigoimage.com/count/print.html). 
    The Guilloché, a security pattern used originally on medieval armor and pottery, was first applied 
to paper currency by the National Bank of the Netherlands (AD 1814). The Guilloché has evolved 
from a simple repeating symmetrical design, through to elaborate spirographical designs. Guilloché is 
seen in Figure 2. 
(a)  (b) 
Fig.2. (a) Guilloché can be found on the New Zealand banknotes just to the left of the portrait. (b) As 
the Guilloché is zoomed, it degrades gracefully maintaining detail, desktop grade publishing currently 
does not render this fine level of detail. 
     A latent image results from the Intaglio print process, this is achievable only under enormous 
pressure, and a fine raised ink pattern is rendered variable in contrast to the foreground. This is 
achieved by printing lines perpendicular to each other representing a foreground and background 
which varies by the viewing angle. There are limitations, latent images are only viewable under a 
certain angle, due to wear and tear the Intaglio print press tactile relief degrades. 
Although latent images are near impossible for counterfeiters to reproduce without special 
purpose Intaglio print press machines, which sale and ownership are closely monitored by the 
authorities [3]. They are not robust security measures for high frequency use. Austria, Germany, 
Switzerland among others used latent images before the introduction of the Euro, it appears that this 
will not become a standard considering the inevitable wear and tear. 
Vignettes are decorative, ornate, and intricate designs traditionally used as chapter or section 
separators in books, traditionally well suited to currency enhancing security. Vignette examples can 
be seen in most currency, noteworthy examples are shown on the Australian 1992 series $5 dollar 
notes, Australian polymer notes incorporate a vignette inside of the clear window, this shows that 
security components can be combined creating more complex obstacles for counterfeiters, though 
their use alone is questionable. 
Certain scanners, copiers, and desktop publishing software will fail to reproduce documents 
where anti-copy marks are detected, known as screen traps. The idea is to thwart attack by image 
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recognition, when an image is captured, a series of checks for known forbidden images take place. If 
the software or device recognizes a forbidden security image, it will refuse to continue theoretically 
rendering unauthorized reproduction impossible. Whilst this is a sound idea, there are limitations, 
software or devices must have such measures embedded or the screen trap is ineffective. 
    The EURion constellation [50] found on Euro notes, consists of five circles in exact distance apart, 
size, proportion and colour. If a copier, scanner, or software that is designed to protect against 
documents displaying the EURion recognizes this pattern, it will stop and present the user with an 
according error message. Tests show that the constellation must be of exact measurements and colour 
properties, if the constellation varies by even the most minute variation, copying is possible [29, 50]. 
    Screen traps may also consist of hidden information which upon copying alters the printed output, 
such as printing the word copy repeatedly across a page rendering it void [51]. Similar to the Moiré 
effect, this is a more robust measure relying on the common optical effects occurring in nature than on 
specific functions to be presented in software [51].  
    Certain laser printers have been found to systematically print yellow dots, making the device 
identifiable [52]. These yellow dots are hidden codes that allow for the determination of the make and 
model [53]. A similar method is presented for steganographic techniques in bicolour printed 
documents, by pseudo-randomly distributing tiny black dots [54], preliminary tests show that this 
method, in contrast to similar methods, can be applied to any bicolour document consisting of images, 
not only alphanumeric documents. 
    Security strength can be calculated to determine how effective a screen trap will be when 
implemented with thermal injet, dry electrophotographic and liquid electrophotographic printing [55, 
56, 57]. The colour-tile, standard barcode, and 2D are investigated, colour-tiles prove to be an 
effective method for measuring colour fidelity. Such findings allow for discrimination of recent 
documents where ink has not been exposed to light for long duration of time, monotone methods such 
as standard and 2D barcodes therefore appear to be more robust. 
    Watermarks are specific areas of paper deliberately made thinner providing a higher level of 
transparency than the rest of the paper so that light passes through easier. Watermarks are embedded 
in one of two ways: the dandy roll method and the cylinder mould method. As pulp emerges from the 
vat, it is almost completely water, the water is pressed out compressing the fibres by placing a kind of 
wire stencil pressed against the pulp before it dries the impression remains. 
    This impression is what imprints the watermark, numerous attempts have been made to recreate 
watermarks. Even though the process of creating watermarks is practically as old as paper, forgery 
attempts have been highly unsuccessful. However, Art Williams, the master US counterfeiter, 
embedded a centre substrate layer with a hand drawn watermark between, when held up to a light 
source, a semi-passable imitation watermark appeared [1]. 
    Improving the traditional watermark is a method called the Optical Variable Watermark (OVW), 
micro apertures are embedded directly in polymer substrate as a series of pulse width modulated 
pixels. The structure is divided into two channels, the individual pieces of artwork are interlaced with 
each row so that each second row is of a subsequent image. 
    When multiple layers are used, each layer embeds a secret payload using phase modulation. Super-
positioning multiple layers, each having a specific carrier structure using the right combination is 
known as the ‘key’. When the key is positioned, the hidden information below is revealed in its plain 
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unencrypted form [58, 59]. This seems feasible for single, one-off, security documents such as 
diplomas and certificates, however where one key authenticates individual document, key 
management for banknotes would be cumbersome. 
    A novel approach has been developed where images are watermarked with a payload of data 
processed by Direct Spread Spectrum (DSS), then embedded data by using Peak Position Modulation 
(PPM) [60]. Most watermarking techniques embed data in one colour component, or independently in 
each colour component [61]. 
    Minute text or micro-text is printed in inconspicuous areas, such text is often only visible through a 
magnifying glass, or microscope. Typical desktop publishing is unable to render text at such intricate 
detail similar to the Guilloché. Counterfeit attempts are detected when the text appears as a line, 
higher quality desktop equipment may be capable of rendering it, but as we magnify the area, edges 
begin to blur. 
    A serial number shown in Figure 3 uniquely identifies an individual banknote, and is stored in a 
database. Repetition of the same serial number will never occur on authentic currency, many 
counterfeit attempts have been detected by observing repeating serial numbers. The exact method for 
creating serial numbers differs from one country to the next. 
 
Fig. 3. A unique identifier, the serial number is usually found repeated vertically on the left hand side 
and horizontally on the right hand side of both the front and back. 
    Clearly the serial number is a simple yet effective security measure. The serial number allows 
issuing authorities to monitor the circulation of currency. Typically ATMs and banknote sorting 
machines check this through character recognition techniques, comparing values stored in the 
database. The age of ink can be determined through various methods such as the secret service ink 
database, potentially enabling automated detection of counterfeit also using legitimate reproduced or 
copied serial numbers discriminating the ink age against the reported serial number age. 
2) Authenticating Security Components 
    Additional security regarding paper currency is implemented through external authentication 
devices implemented in ATMs and automatic banknote sorting machines. Using banknote recognition 
software both minimizes, controls the flow of counterfeit and worn out banknotes for destruction. A 
brief discussion of such software follows whilst outlining three core functions image processing, 
feature extraction and classification. 
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    After the image of a banknote has been captured, it must be pre-processed to have specific 
characteristics of interest singled out. First, the edges of the banknote image must be recognized and 
captured. Typically pre-processing an image of a banknote consists of a binarization stage, an edge 
detection stage and distortion correction. 
    A modified Canny edge detection is used [62] for removal of noise and background from captured 
images. The Canny algorithm marks a point as an edge if the amplitude is larger than its neighbours 
without checking that the differences are higher than expected. This results in the algorithm being 
sensitive to weak edges such as where the colours are similar or where there is blurring in the picture. 
    Traditional line fitting is insufficient for banknote recognition, as images contain false edge points 
[17]. Hough transform is used to detect edges of the paper, removing distortion borrowing from 
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) techniques. The Hough transform method is well suited to the 
detection of banknotes which have been in circulation, this is because of its ability to detect lines 
where there are gaps in the captured image. 
    Thresholding is an important technique for image segmentation. Thresholding allows applications 
to identify and extract a target from a background of a distribution of grayscale levels or texture in 
image objects. The correct threshold value is determined using adaptive thresholding [21]. This 
method shows robustness to strong illumination changes, this means that the end system is able to be 
used under different kinds of environments. The threshold value is critical to obtain the right data in 
the onset before carrying on through to the next phases. 
    The next stage is the extraction of specific features for which to determine the authenticity, this is 
directly related to the selection of specific security components. Much of the observed literature 
focuses on the extraction of specific ROIs for consideration of banknote colour, print and image 
fidelity. A captured banknote image is often sectioned into small areas, each input into a separate 
template matching processes [63]. A threshold is used for each subsection, contributing to a threshold 
ratio or T-ratio.  
   One of the known powerful tools for texture description is Local Binary Pattern (LBP) of a pixel p  
, by Ojala et al as shown in equation (2) [107].  
∑
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    Methods based on LBP and BP network are used for paper currency in [64, 65], in [64] whole 
paper currency image segmented into NM ×  blocks, each block is subject to a Local Binary Pattern 
(LBP) method. Each pixel within the block is calculated and assigned LBP value on the basis of the 
pixel value each block histogram is made, to reduce the dimensions of the histogram, LBP values are 
quantised using equation (4). 
17 
 
QggspLBP
i
pi
i /))(2()(
7
0
∑
=
−=                                                         (4) 
where Q ≠ 0 is a scale factor of quantization reducing the number of patterns in the resulting 
histogram to 32, which results in a grayscale histogram of 256 bins normalized to give uniform 
amounts across banknotes. Limiting to a total 256 values representing possible colours from a much 
wider array of possible colours, again it possibly looses vital information. Some currencies use a wide 
range of colours, this is especially vital when the colours used are close to each other in both location 
on the colour spectrum and physical location. 
    In [21], digital image processing approach concepts like eigen-face and Principle Component 
Analysis (PCA) is utilised to identify the U.S. banknote denomination for visually impaired people 
using smartphones. 
    A PCA functions for image feature extraction and compression. PCA [66, 67] is well suited for 
extracting characteristics from banknotes, as banknotes are high quality documents, much 
classification data is captured. When implementing smart detection devices into ATM and banknote 
sorting machines, time is a critical factor, as the PCA is used to determine the necessary features, we 
can be assured that only the necessary elements are being checked for. 
    Following extraction, the Kohonen based Self-Organizing Map (SOM) model is used to cluster data 
extracted into homogenous regions, where SOMs are used as a pre-preparation phase, the SOM forms 
a map corresponding to the data distribution so that regions of the map can be interpreted as clusters 
in the data space [67]. 
    Speeded Up Robust Features (SURF), inspired by Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) is 
used. Feature selection to find an image of a banknote in any orientation is then possible using 
location of interest points [68, 69]. A banknote image is able to be recognized in various 
environments, orientations and distances from the camera, tests show a 100% accuracy level. This 
would be an attractive option when considering development of surveillance devices detecting 
fraudulent currency for instance Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) footage located in a convenience 
store. 
    ROI approach is using Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) for scaling and shifting with Packet 
Wavelet Analysis (PWA), and Maximum Overlap Algorithm (MOA) [70]. This approach is found to 
be suitable for extraction of characteristics where defects such as wrinkles and holes caused by wear 
and tear are particularly troublesome. In developing countries, notes are circulated for longer before 
being disposed, thus counterfeit notes in these circumstances are more likely to remain in circulation. 
Not only is it imperative to account for wrinkles and holes [71], as a joint effect including dust and 
old age discolouring the notes over time and the randomness [70]. 
    Character recognition using masking, geometric masks are applied to specific areas of interest, the 
amount of pixels obtained determines the character. Using single masks is insufficient, Axis 
Symmetric Masks (ASM) improves the accuracy by using multiple geometric shapes to extract more 
data about the area [22]. 
    The final stage, feature classification uses various machine learning and pattern recognition 
techniques. Known good values or learned templates are used for side by side comparison, the 
threshold learned through training on those characteristics previously determined. This approach 
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allows for dynamic understanding of the medium, rather than setting strict values which would tend to 
be too restrictive. 
    Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) is used in much of the literature. Genetic Algorithm (GA) is 
combined with Back-Propagation (BP) [15, 72, 73, 74]. In each case, an increase performance was 
observed over using ANN alone. Ensemble Neural Network (ENN), a finite collection of NNs are 
trained to perform an identical task, input vectors are applied simultaneously in all ensembles. To 
ensure diversity among the individual ENN networks, Negative Correlation Learning (NCL) is 
applied, it is observed that notes containing more noise are classified correctly at a higher rate 
compared to single NN [18, 19]. A Counter Propagation Network (CPN) is used for note classification 
by [67], it is found that CPN gives greater accuracy for banknote classification over BP. By using a 
Bi-directional Associative Memory (BAM) technique, it was observed a 96.08% recognition rate with 
the remaining uncategorizable due to wear and tear [75]. 
    Support Vector Machines (SVM) appears to be widely used throughout the literature and promise a 
wide variety of applications such as banknote classification [76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81]. SVM is 
successfully implemented to recognize serial numbers on banknotes [82], and used for detection of 
stains to determine worn out banknotes [81]. Results show classification accuracy comparable to that 
of ANN, however it is determined that using multiple kernel SVM can increase accuracy and overall 
performance [27]. 
    Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ), implemented by [66, 83], LVQ is relatively inefficient when 
compared to similar algorithms. As observed [66], though PCA was used before classification, to 
increase reliability, this method still requires a subsequent clustering phase model the complexity of 
the classified data, decreasing overall performance. 
    AdaBoost machine learning algorithm was applied on the N most discriminating features [20], the 
ratio between red and blue intensity channels is measured for those areas. It is found that using the 
colour channels over grayscale level characteristic intensity channels provides a significant 
improvement on classification performance when applied on identical training sets. 
    Hidden Markov Models (HMM) with Gaussian methods was used [84], a comparative analysis 
study of HMM, SVM and ANN is performed [84]. HMM outperformed both SVM and ANN, test 
results show HMM 93.92%, ANN 92.8% and SVM 88.52% [84]. HMM looks to be an attractive 
option due to the higher classification accuracy, furthermore as HMM can learn feature sets overtime 
we can tune strictly for what we need to check for using sound discriminative features. 
    Clearly, the security printing industry is making continual technological advances for which not 
only forensics needs to catch up, so too do the devices in the public domain which authenticate our 
banknotes. Specific qualities such as polymer security substrate characteristics, security fibre, security 
thread and watermark authentication have not yet been explored. 
C. Protocols, Tools and Systems 
    Various tools and systems have been developed to authenticate banknotes through analysis of 
specific security components. Much of which is focussed on detecting incorrect or duplicate serial 
numbers, and assessing image fidelity. Although much research has been carried out concerning new 
document security techniques, issuers still rely largely on checking these legacy components. 
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Table III. A list of the representative work in the currency security components section 
Security 
Layer  
Features Techniques The work 
Layer 1 Security 
patterns 
1. Concaved iridescent texture 
2. Bilinear coons patch  
3. EURion constellation  
4. Anti-copy mark morphology screen coding HVS 
[46] 
[49] 
[50] 
[51] 
Layer 2 Information 
hiding 
 
 
Anti-copy 
mark 
 
5. Optical watermarking  
6. Semi-covert watermarking/information hiding using 
dots on bi-colour documents 
 
7. 2D colour barcode security payload density 
measurement 
8. (yellow dots) representing serial number of printer 
[58,59] 
[54] 
 
 
[55, 56, 57] 
 
[52, 53] 
 
Layer 3 Microtext 
Substrate  
 
9. Character recognition  
10. Fingerprinting paper texture  
[48] 
[47] 
 
    The serial number uniquely identifies a specific banknote, in some currencies the make and model 
of machinery can be pinpointed. The Euro currency includes a prefix denoting the country of issue. 
Intaglio print press machinery manufacture sale is strictly monitored by authorities, such as Interpol 
and the US Secret Service, thus serial numbers allow forensic examiners to pinpoint the printer 
locality of authentic notes. A low cost microcontroller device is developed [85], this shows that 
devices dedicated for a specific authentication task can be independently developed and used where 
required. Clearly serial number recognition is an extremely important and useful tool for both 
banknote security and currency forensics applications. 
    A combined hardware and software approach is provided by [109] for distinguishing between the 
original and fake Euros banknotes, by capturing the image of banknote with a near infrared camera. 
This approach also provides us the denomination of the Euro. 
    Physical currency, such as banknotes will remain in high demand at least for the near future, 
however over recent decades, there has been a paradigm shift towards the use of electronic currency. 
Electronic currency adds a whole new dimension for currency security and forensics, encompassing 
many forms from debit cards, Electronic Cash (e-Cash), right through to virtual money. 
    Here a synthesis towards a unified understanding of the variations observed in the literature is 
conducted with an emphasis on both implications for currency security and forensics. It is interesting 
to observe a lack of governance over the wide array of somewhat obscure variations [86, 87, 88], 
which may be precisely why there is an increasing array of models which are not compatible with one 
another. 
    Architectures known as mobile Cash (m-Cash) allow users to securely withdraw physical cash from 
ATM machines, using capable phones equipped with compatible RFID tags, and participating ATMs 
which have RFID readers. This encompasses an architecture incorporating a set of secure protocols 
for which the user may choose to only withdraw paper money through the phone replacing the 
traditional Personal Identification Number (PIN) [89, 90]. 
    Similarly mobile payment architectures are used where payments can be made directly from person 
to person, business to business, or person to business and vice versa [91]. There are a range of options 
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where the phone is either linked through a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card, to personal bank 
account, or to a temporary deposit account similar to a prepay system where the prepay credit is able 
to be exchanged for goods and services. 
    The level of access in the mobile payment model determines the level of risk involved. If the SIM 
card is linked to a users’ personal bank account, the user is vulnerable to potentially higher losses than 
to temporary deposit accounts. The risks involved must be supported by sufficient security measures, 
a secure protocol is developed for person to person transactions through wireless networks using 
mobile devices [92], the primary concerns here regard the security of the public networks and the 
protocols facilitating the communication over these networks facilitated through encryption 
communication protocols. 
    Electronic cash or (e-Cash) system is closely related to physical paper currency, interestingly and 
contrary to what one might think, e-Cash can provide anonymity. An e-Cash scheme lets a user 
withdraw money from a bank and spend it anonymously, this is achieved through cryptography and 
one-way hashing functions. An endorsed e-Cash scheme is proposed [93], a user may offer cash for 
payments offering more than one instance of the same item of e-Cash. However the merchant may 
only accept and complete the transaction once a third-party endorses the e-Cash instance, such as an 
issuing entity or third party trusted authority eliminating the double spending problem. 
    Architectures for e-Cash have been shown whereby virtual currency is transferred and managed on 
a server. The currency lives within a holding location until the transaction is confirmed by the 
endorsement procedure, and then finally completed [94]. Once the transaction is confirmed through 
the endorsement procedure, the currency or funds are then transferred into the recipients account. 
    A blind signature gives users complete anonymity making use of cryptographic protocols, an e-
Cash transaction architecture is proposed employing the RSA public key cryptography system [95, 
96]. The transaction is hidden from third parties, however in preserving this anonymity, certain 
security is lost, such as potential information supporting the audit money laundering. A method is 
proposed where trust relationships exist as rings of trusted banks, only trusted third parties specifically 
banks within the same ring may be aware of the users transactions [97], anonymity is restricted within 
the realm of trusted third parties. 
       Well known websites and online communities such as iTunes, Facebook.com, and World Of 
Warcraft (WOW) offer schemes where physical currency can be used to buy virtual currency. This 
virtual currency exists within the realm that it was bought for, online games for instance allow users 
to trade and auction artifacts with one-another inside the virtual world, such as weapons in the case of 
WOW, buy applications and music with iTunes. One-way virtual currency and two-way have been 
compared recently, it was concluded that many operators are not obliged to provide two-way 
exchange and typically do not. It appears this is primarily as it will cause a loss in profit and 
incompatibility with physical currency, concluding that two-way exchanges benefit both operators 
and users in the long run [98]. 
    A solution to this problem aptly termed Common Money (CONEY) has recently been proposed 
where virtual money is managed within local sovereignties [99]. Each region defines and maintains 
local virtual currency compatible and exchangeable with physical currency. The architecture shows 
that local currencies can be integrated so that local virtual currency and local physical currency are 
synonymous with one another. Personal accounts are linked providing mechanisms for transfer from 
virtual to physical inside ones’ own borders managed by these local servers. 
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    There are many concerns regarding electronic currency from both a security and a forensic 
perspective, traditional concerns such as cryptographic protocols to facilitate data transport is primary. 
The lack of governance in the electronic realm leaves many doors open for money launderers to 
exploit. Hiding an electronic trail obfuscating transaction details is clearly made possible by abusing 
the use of blind signatures and the many obscure incompatible entities providing virtual currency 
facilities. 
    A recent emerging field of research is that of hybrid electronic-physical currency, to date the focus 
has been on the integration of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) devices with paper currency. 
Research shows that RFID devices for application to banknotes. This gives banknotes the ability to 
communicate signatures with authentication and merchant devices. 
    Specifically, RFID tags embedded with encoded spectral signatures in printable thin flexible 
substrate circuit have been proposed as a subsequent security component for banknotes [100]. The use 
of RFID for both tracking of notes by law enforcement and authentication by merchants has been 
demonstrated, to enhance security memory cells is added, whilst adopting challenge responses 
protocol to avoid possible eavesdroppers stealing an access-key [101]. 
    A paper currency management system is proposed to facilitate the distribution of uniform size wads 
of banknotes. An Ultra High Frequency (UHF) dipole tag based antenna with a short stub and 
meander lines [102]. RFID management systems can be applied in the management of supply chain. 
Facilitating management of banknote distribution to local bank branches, cuts down the human error 
involved in recording track and trace details of in transit wads. 
Table IV. A list of the representative work in the authentication security components section 
Tasks  Methods  The work 
Feature 
extraction 
1. Canny edge detection  
2. Hough transform edge detection 
3. Adaptive thresholding, PCA  
4. SOM and PCA for extraction 
5. Dynamic template matching, adaptive strictness  
6. Block-LBP algorithm, characteristic extraction  
7. Back propagation neural network for orientation recognition 
8. Banknote deterioration energy dust and wrinkle factor 
Evaluation 
[62] 
[17] 
[21,66] 
[67] 
[63] 
[64] 
[65] 
[71] 
Classification 9. LVQ for classification  
10. CPN for classification  
11. SURF for feature extraction  
12. Discrete wavelet transform, packet wavelet analysis, 
maximum overlap algorithm 
13. Genetic algorithm is combined with back-propagation  
14. Ensemble neural network  
15. Counter propagation network 
16. Bi-directional associative memory 
17. Support Vector Machines  
 
18. Multiple Kernel Support Vector Machines  
19. Learning Vector Quantization  
20. Adaboost 
21. Hidden Markov Model  
[66] 
[67] 
[68,69] 
[70] 
 
[72,15,73,74] 
[18,19] 
[67] 
[75] 
[76,77,78,79, 
80,81,82] 
[27] 
[83,66] 
[20] 
[84]  
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III. Trends 
    One could be forgiven for assuming that it is not going to be too long before electronic currency 
replaces paper currency [103]. On the contrary, physically exchangeable currency is here to stay, at 
least for the near future. This is due to a number of factors: (1) a sense of anonymity is felt in the 
transaction; (2) much of the world does not have sufficient infrastructure to facilitate a completely 
electronic currency; (3) a common feeling of distrust towards the exchange of electronic funds 
considering numerous reported breaches in the media of late and; (4) a sense of nationalism felt 
through iconography of the locally unique artwork on currency [104]. 
    The current trend in physical paper based currency shows the use of paper will continue for the near 
future, perhaps because the majority of substrate manufacturers prefer the lower cost associated. 
Polymer banknotes, although initially more expensive appear to be gaining in popularity, countries 
such as Australia, New Zealand, Romania, Singapore and Vietnam among others have fully replaced 
paper. All such countries have reported a decrease in both the long-term costs associated with their 
longevity and lower rates of detected counterfeits than their predecessor. 
    Louisenthal one of the world’s largest specialist security paper substrate manufacturers have 
adopted polymer to create a new hybrid-paper substrate. This integration shows that the added 
benefits of polymer are not only being realized by countries whom have adopted polymer in full but 
those who produce security paper, providing a secondary option to their customers.  
    Banknote security and counterfeit detection research is a growing area, developing software for 
smart devices integrated into ATMs and central banknote sorting machines. Despite most devices 
focus on the legacy components of serial number and print fidelity. Implementing security detection 
devices at ATMs, to control the flow of counterfeit currency through to central points for disposal is 
now common place. Although the available literature predominantly tends towards paper currency, 
there is a clear need for polymer research. It has been identified that polymer has its own unique 
surface characteristics; authentication of polymer surface characteristics would influence future 
research and development towards machines recognizing specific characteristics intrinsic to polymer. 
    Print signature or printer profile analysis is a promising move towards a secondary level of 
confidence for the forensic investigator, potentially allowing for document origination to be correlated 
with individual printers. It is shown in [34, 35, 36, 40, 78, 79, 105, 106], print anomalies can be 
detected and calculated to create a signature based on pixel distribution and satellite droplets. 
Similarly texture analysis of paper [41, 47] investigates various qualities of the texture and roughness 
of surfaces relating to documents and banknotes, similarly [42] investigates the texture of the ink 
pattern. Classifications of ink, paper and printing techniques are invaluable to both forensic 
investigation and security banknote recognition software. 
    Security features such as watermarks, security fibres, security threads, and security patterns appear 
to be some of the oldest yet most effective methods for thwarting counterfeit attempts. Crude attempts 
have been shown to at least thwart the first level of security defences, but appear to generally be 
detected through electronic analysis by the aforementioned ATMs and banknote sorting machines. To 
stay ahead of the curve, novel approaches are realizing real-world potential such as variations of the 
hologram specifically the Kinegram, moreover as cryptographic methods applied through RFID. 
    The paradigm shift towards use of electronic currency as a medium appears to be well on the way 
and definitely here to stay, similar to RFID electronic currency is made possible through 
cryptographic algorithms. Traditionally credit and debit cards have primarily been used. Over the last 
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decade, there has been an explosion in the variety of electronic currencies, such as virtual currencies 
for spending within online communities and mobile person to person, or person to business 
transactions. Much of this infrastructure remains widely incompatible with one another and lacking in 
governance. Proposals have been put forth suggesting the implementation of interoperable governed 
virtual currency systems.  
    To conclude this section, physical currency will be around for the near future, polymer banknotes 
offer advanced security features over paper substrate. Much of the research to date has focussed on 
developing devices to identify worn out and counterfeit notes ATM and central bank note sorting 
machines. The method of classification between worn out or counterfeit against an authentic note in 
good condition is the image fidelity. Research on texture analysis of paper and ink is showing signs of 
hope for pinpointing make and model of printer used. 
Table V. A list of the representative work in the protocols, tools and system section 
Paradigms  Usages  The work 
Physical currency 1. Serial number micro-controller recognition device  
http://www.google.co.in/patents/US20110206265 
[85] 
Electronic currency 2. M-Cash, ATM withdrawal protocol 
http://www.gi-de.com/en/products_and_solutions/products/ 
electronic_ payment/electronic-payment.jsp 
 
3. Mobile payment  
http://www.gi-de.com/en/products_and_solution 
s/solutions/mobile_money/mobile-money.jsp 
4. Endorsed e-Cash  
5. RSA based e-Cash  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecash 
6. e-Cash with group signature  
7. Common money (CONEY)  
[89,90] 
 
 
 
[91] 
 
[93, 95] 
[94] 
 
[96] 
[99] 
RFID 8. RFID embedding  
9. RFID banknote bundle management  
http://www.fleur-de-coin.com/eurocoins/banknote-rfid 
[100,101] 
[102] 
 
IV. Future Work 
To date there is little research in the area of forensic science focusing strictly on currency when 
compared to other areas. Other areas of discipline were examined to build a foundation, we need 
understand the process of security printing, the ingredients and characteristics of substrates, inks and 
complexities of integrated security components. 
    Extensive research exists for applications of computer vision and machine learning in ATM or 
banknote sorting machines. Research in this area looks at the texture of the substrate surface, pixel 
distribution patterns, pigments in ink, fluorescence levels emitted from specific parts of the note and 
strict analysis of specific regions of interest such as watermarks and overall design. 
    Ultimately, a robust form of currency to both forgery and fatigue is desired, polymer the latest in 
banknote substrate. Even polymer is not immune to counterfeiting and appears that the level of 
sophistication is on the rise. As polymer is a new and emerging technology, it is absolutely critical 
that the field of forensics is equipped to identify forgery. 
    Analyzing how ink reacts to polymer may eventually enable for the determination of ink age on 
polymer substrates. Evidence to determine the date for the actual forgery, supposing the ink was 
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bought commercially, the raw material makeup of the ink should lead us to possibilities of 
determination of location to begin a trail to follow for investigation. 
    There are many aspects of physical currency yet to explore, the watermark, security threads, and 
fibres are some of the oldest, and simplest yet most effective techniques in securing documents. These 
methods are incredibly difficult to replicate, crude attempts have been seen, yet these are not checked 
in banknote authentication devices. 
    The governance of electronic currency systems is lacking and therefore needs to be reviewed. 
Proposals have been put forth suggesting models to integrate virtual currency and physical currency 
thus bridging the gap. Not only do systems need to be reviewed for integration models, the 
jurisdictional issues defining the rules and regulations within these systems collaborating with other 
systems need to be specified in consideration of this ubiquitous paradigm. 
V. CONCLUSION 
To conclude, this has been a survey of the current state of the art within the field of forensics dealing 
with currency security. A survey was necessary, as there is no known available research specifically 
dealing with counterfeit currency or electronic fraud from a forensic investigator. To fully appreciate 
this area, a look at where currency came from, and how it has evolved into what we have today. 
Currency has been around since ancient times and has taken many forms. 
    To detect flaws and analyze with any scientific merit, we need understand how currency is 
manufactured. We need also understand what it is made from, the raw materials, the unique 
components such as watermarks, security threads, and micro-text whilst considering how these 
interact with one another. Each of the numerous elements has their unique characteristics, these 
systematically become evident over the same series of currency. 
    Banknotes are produced from a painstakingly precise engineering process integrating beautiful 
artwork, and optical security components. The general public does not go out of their way to check for 
known security features, if it feels and looks good at first glance then it must be authentic. The 
previous point illustrates the first layer of the three layers of banknote security. Specifically the first 
layer is that which by the first glance and touch humans can identify. The second requires more in-
depth investigation like with UV light, or magnifying glass. The third combines those features which 
require yet more in-depth investigation in a special purpose laboratory. 
    Traditionally, complexity of design was paper currency’s greatest defence, reproducing the artwork 
required a great deal of skill and talent. Today’s quality and complexity are still used as a major 
deterrence, intricate designs are still not possible on commonly available reprographic equipment. As 
technological advances continue to improve desktop publishing abilities, design may no longer be 
deterrence in itself and remain only for tradition sake. 
    Traditionally banknotes in question have been checked by specially trained Questioned Document 
Examiners (QDE), QDEs analyze such aspects as ink quality, print quality, substrate, and handwriting 
characteristics. The Secret Service was originally entrusted to fight the battle against counterfeiters of 
the US currency are still at the forefront of currency forensics. 
    Those who are successful at counterfeiting become that way through motivation and resources. It is 
interesting to see that not only do the security features of banknotes become more sophisticated, but 
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also do the skills and resources of counterfeiters. Automatic banknote sorting and authentication have 
been adopted by many banks worldwide embedded in ATMs and central banknote sorting machines. 
    Such devices check the colour quality and characteristics of the note, when the particular threshold 
has not been met, the note is deemed either counterfeit, or no longer fit for recirculation. 
Understandably, this is essential to protecting a country’s economy. Counterfeiters may perfect 
perhaps one or more security components, however, it is only necessary to perfect as many as 
necessary pass them quickly and covertly. Therefore a more holistic approach is needed, although 
somewhat of a distant future, the idea is that authenticating all components known will build 
robustness into the currency system. 
    The banknote polymer substrate is gaining popularity, so much that the notable security paper 
manufacturer Louisenthal has adopted it offering a hybrid paper-polymer note. Yet research of 
polymer currency is almost nonexistent. Clearly, there is a need to develop methods for currency 
forensics moving towards specific automatic polymer banknote authentication devices, using the 
unique intrinsic characteristics of polymer. 
    Clearly electronic currency is the new medium for exchange, electronic currency due to its many 
varieties is somewhat difficult to define. Making it even more difficult to describe is the fact that the 
varieties are often incompatible with one another and even traditional currency, whilst lacking 
governance. Despite the convenience of electronic transactions, physical paper money as paper 
currency still provides benefits over electronic currency such as full anonymity of payment and a 
reducing more controlled form of currency. 
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